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Abstract—Preserving the privacy of user input sent to a cloud-
based machine learning inference service is a critical need. One
approach for private inference is to run the trained model within
a secure hardware enclave. The user then sends encrypted data
into the enclave, which is then decrypted within the enclave
before running the inference entirely within the enclave. Secure
enclaves, like Intel SGX, however, impose several restrictions.
First, enclaves can only access limited memory without relying
on expensive paging, thereby limiting the size of the model than
can be run efficiently. Second, the increasing use of accelerators
like GPUs and TPUs for inference will be curtailed in this mode
of execution as accelerators currently do not provide enclaves.
To tackle these challenges, this work presents Origami, which
provides privacy-preserving inference for large deep neural
network (DNN) models through a combination of enclave execu-
tion, cryptographic blinding, interspersed with accelerator-based
computation. Origami partitions the ML model into multiple
partitions. The first partition receives the encrypted user input
within an SGX enclave. The enclave decrypts the input and
then applies cryptographic blinding to the input data and the
model parameters. Cryptographic blinding is a technique that
adds noise to obfuscate data. Origami sends the obfuscated data
for computation to an untrusted GPU/CPU. The blinding and
de-blinding factors are kept private by the SGX enclave, thereby
preventing any adversary from denoising the data, when the
computation is offloaded to a GPU/CPU. The computed output
is returned to the enclave, which decodes the computation on
noisy data using the unblinding factors privately stored within
SGX. This process may be repeated for each DNN layer, as has
been done in prior work Slalom.
However, the overhead of blinding and unblinding the data is
a limiting factor to scalability. Origami relies on the empirical
observation that the feature maps after the first several layers
can not be used, even by a powerful conditional GAN adversary
to reconstruct input. Hence, Origami dynamically switches to
executing the rest of the DNN layers directly on an accelerator
without needing any further cryptographic blinding intervention
to preserve privacy. We empirically demonstrate that using
Origami, a conditional GAN adversary, even with an unlimited
inference budget, cannot reconstruct the input. We implement
and demonstrate the performance gains of Origami using the
VGG-16 and VGG-19 models. Compared to running the entire
VGG-19 model within SGX, Origami inference improves the
performance of private inference from 11x while using Slalom to
15.1x.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning (DL) has made significant strides possible
in computer vision, machine translation, robotics, healthcare,
etc. Training on large volumes of data is necessary to make
supervised deep learning models accurate. As a consequence,
the development of DL models happens primarily at organi-
zations that have access to large data sets. After training, the
trained DL models may be deployed in the cloud to serve
user requests. With the rise in MLaaS (Machine Learning
as a Service) offerings by cloud vendors like Amazon AWS,
Microsoft Azure and Google cloud, organizations may deploy
pre-trained models in the cloud. Users need to send their
data such as images and text for inference. While running
in the cloud the DL models can be exposed to a wide
attack surface consisting of malicious users, compromised
hypervisors and physical snooping, leading to data leakage.
Users expect the service providers to protect the confidentiality
of their data. It is the responsibility of the service providers
to meet the user expectations and not compromise privacy of
user data accidentally or otherwise. Regulations like GDPR
are attempting to enforce this requirement on all organizations
handling private user data.
One approach to protect confidentiality of data is using
cryptographic deep learning models [11], [23]. These DL
models can process encrypted user data and as a result
cannot leak confidential user data. The main limitation with
this approach is that it can take orders of magnitude more
processing time than non-cryptographic DL models, which is
a severe limitation in user facing services.
Another technique to protect confidentiality is leveraging
Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) like Intel SGX [26],
ARM TrustZone [1] or Sanctum [7]. Classic techniques like
data encryption can protect the data during it’s storage and
communication phases. TEEs complement these protections by
protecting the data during computation phase. TEEs achieve
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this task by using a combination of hardware and software
techniques to isolate and protect sensitive data and compu-
tations. These security features can be exploited to provide
private inference capabilities. For instance, one approach for
private inference is to run the complete trained model within
an Intel SGX enclave, which is invisible to the cloud service
provider or even a potential hacker with root access to the
cloud server. The user then sends encrypted data into the
enclave, which is then decrypted within the enclave before
running the inference entirely within the enclave.
However, running an entire model inference within a TEE
provides several practical hurdles. First accelerators such as
GPUs do not support trusted execution. Hence, applications
cannot take advantage of the growing list of DL accelerators,
such as GPUs and TPUs, if they rely purely on TEE to achieve
privacy. Second, TEEs do not support efficient execution of
arbitrarily large programs. Typically the program memory
footprint is limited to a threshold. This threshold is less than
128 MB for Intel SGX enclaves. When the program memory
limit exceeds the threshold then frequent swapping of data in
and out of SGX leads to significant performance slowdowns.
This overhead stems from the fact that moving pages in and
out of SGX enclaves requires decryption and encryption of
data.
Popular DL models such as VGG-16 and VGG-19 [32]
have large memory footprint, larger than the SGX memory
limit. The performance gap between running DL models
within SGX compared to running DL model inference on an
untrusted GPU/CPU is very high. As we demonstrate later,
in our experimental setup running a VGG-19 model inference
entirely within SGX is 105 times slower than running it on a
GPU, and is 6.5 times slower than running it on a CPU. These
drastic slowdowns makes it unpalatable to use SGX to run the
entire inference models within SGX.
Model splitting: To minimize the negative performance
impacts of SGX, hardware vendors recommend that a program
be carefully split into sensitive and non-sensitive parts, and
schedule only the sensitive part to be executed inside the TEE.
They also recommend to minimize the sensitive code to reduce
latency. Following this guidance specifically for deep neural
network (DNN) models (a particular variant of DL models),
one approach we explored is to perform some of the DNN
layers within SGX and allow other layers to be executed
outside of SGX. Since DNNs provide a clean layer abstraction
it is possible to re-design the models such that only the first
few layers are executed within a secure container while the
remaining layers are executed in an untrusted container. The
computations that are performed outside of SGX can take
advantage of accelerators such as GPUs. However, care must
be taken such that the computations performed on a GPU,
without the benefit of SGX protection, should still protect the
privacy of user input.
Given the above discussed limitations, in this paper, we
propose Origami Inference, a new inference framework that
lowers the performance overhead of using TEE while pro-
tecting the privacy of the user data. It is built on Intel SGX,
but comes with the flexibility to run models that are much
larger than SGX physical protected memory, and can exploit
unsecure accelerators, such as GPUs. Origami is built on the
insight that only the first few layers of the model contain most
of the information that can be used to reconstruct the model’s
input and the output from deeper layers of the model can
not help with input reconstruction. In Origami, a pre-trained
model is split into two partitions. The first partition consists of
multiple layers of a DNN. Each layer within the first partition
is split partially between GPU and SGX enclave. We use
the Slalom approach [33] to offload computationally inten-
sive convolutions (basically matrix multiplications) on GPUs,
while allowing the non-linear operations (such as ReLUs) to
be performed within an enclave. Data privacy is preserved
using Cryptographic blinding of the convolution data before
offloading to the GPU (more details of blinding later). Unlike
Slalom, which continues to split every DNN layer between
GPU and SGX leading to unnecessary overheads, Origami
dynamically switches to offloading the second partition of the
DNN model to execute entirely on a GPU (or even a CPU).
We present and evaluate a conditional GAN adversary
model to verify if a user’s input can be reconstructed from the
intermediate data sent to the GPU. We demonstrate that it is
possible to partition DNNs in such a way that the computation
of the first partition of the model that runs using cryptographic
blinding between GPU and SGX can be minimized. As an
example, for VGG-16 model we find that it is sufficient to
run the first 4 convolutional layers using blinding to protect
input privacy. The remaining 9 convolutional layers and 3
fully connected layers can be executed completely in the open
without input recovery capability.
To summarize this paper makes the following contributions:
1) We design and implement Origami framework that
partitions DNN models between secure enclaves and
unsecure accelerators.
2) Origami uses input obfuscation to cooperatively execute
between an enclave and untrusted CPU/GPU in the early
layers of DNN to protect privacy. It then switches to
uninterrupted execution of the later layers of DNN when
the input reconstruction is no longer feasible.
3) Origami works on a pre-trained model and does not
require any model changes or re-training to achieve its
goals.
4) This work designs a strong conditional generative adver-
sarial network (c-GAN) based framework with unlimited
inference requests as an input reconstruction adversary.
Using the c-GAN we verify that the privacy of the user
input is protected.
5) This work evaluates the Origami framework on Intel
SGX using two unmodified and pre-trained DNN mod-
els, namely VGG-16 and VGG-19, and demonstrates
that up to 15x speedup in inference latency can be
achieved compared to running the full model inside the
SGX secure enclave.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
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vides brief background for the paper. Section 3 describes the
motivation and the two key ideas that lead to the design of
the Origami inference framework. Section 4 describes the
conditional GAN models to verify input privacy. Section 5
describes the implementation details. Section 6 presents the
experimental evaluation. Section 7 presents the related work
and section 8 concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. TEEs and Intel SGX
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX
(Software Guard Extensions), ARM TrustZone [6], [17] enable
execution of programs in secure hardware enclaves. They
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the code and data
that are executed inside the enclaves. In Intels SGX a region of
memory (128 MB by default) is reserved only for enclaves and
memory accesses to this region are restricted by CPU. Only the
instructions executing inside enclave can access this memory
region. Non-enclave code can initialize the enclave via SGX-
related CPU instructions like ECREATE, EENTER, EADD
etc. Operating systems, root users and all other applications
running on the same machine are prevented from accessing
this memory region. Intel SGX provides support for remote
attestation of an initialized enclave. This can be used by a
remote party to verify the code and data inside the enclave
immediately after its initialization. While there have been
some demonstrated side channel attacks on SGX [3], [4], in
this work we assume that SGX execution can be secured using
some of the recently published schemes [35], [36].
III. ORIGAMI: MOTIVATION AND TWO KEY IDEAS
A. Overheads of secure execution
To motivate the need for private inference, consider a cloud
service which is used by a health care provider to classify
medical images of patients. The health care provider (user of
the service) sends private data (an image related to a patient)
that may be processed using the system depicted in figure 1a.
Even if the user encrypts and sends the data, it needs to be
decrypted before processing. The user image becomes visible
to the service and it is the responsibility of the service to
ensure confidentiality of the user data. The services in cloud
are exposed to a wide attack surface like malicious cloud users,
compromised hypervisors, physical snooping.
TEEs like Intel SGX can be used to provide confidentiality
since they support remote attestation and are designed to
protect the confidentiality of the data running inside the secure
enclaves. Consider the service using a TEE based system
shown in figure 1b. In this system after the cloud service
initializes the secure enclave, a user can get remote attestation
that the initialized enclave loaded the proper code to process
the user data. We assume that the model provided by the cloud
service is verifiable by the user before using the service, or
the user of the service may load their own trusted models
for cloud execution. Then the user encrypts the image, before
sending it to the cloud service. The service processes the
encrypted image completely inside a secure enclave. However,
the inference latency of this service can be an one or even two
orders of magnitude longer than the first approach.
In figure 2 we compare the inference runtimes of VGG-
16 and VGG-19 models executing on an unsecure CPU with
two secure enclave configurations (experimental setup details
are shown later). In the first secure enclave configuration the
model data is loaded Just-In-Time (JIT), only when needed,
and in the second enclave configuration all the model data is
pre-loaded. When compared to executing on a CPU with no
privacy, the VGG-16 model runs 18.3x slowly on a secure
enclave with pre-loading of data and 6.4x slowly on a secure
enclave with JIT loading of data. Along the same lines, the
VGG-19 model runs 16.7x slowly on a secure enclave with
pre-loading of data and 6.5x slowly on a secure enclave with
JIT loading of data. The slowdowns are more drastic, when
compared to executing the model entirely on an untrusted GPU
– up to 321 times slower. Eliminating or reducing this runtime
slowdown on secure enclaves motivates Origami inference to
consider model partitioning.
B. Key Idea1: Model partitioning and offloading
Consider a service using a TEE based system with model
partitioning as shown in figure 3a. For example, with VGG-
16, we propose that the 16 layers be split into two tiers L,
16 - L layers. Prior to deploying the model in the cloud,
the first tier with L layers is embedded within the SGX
enclave container. The second tier of 16−L layers is created
as a separate container that can be executed in an open
compute environment inside the CPU or can be offloaded to
an accelerator.
During operation, each inference request is encrypted by the
user of the service and sent to the cloud. The encrypted input
is then received by the first tier in the SGX enclave which
securely decrypts the input. The input is then processed in the
first L layers. The output from the first tier is an intermediate
feature map. The intermediate representation is then fed to
the second tier which may be executed on a GPU/CPU.
As we show in the next section, by appropriately selecting
the L layers for first tier, our model partitioning approach
provides strong guarantees that prevent input reconstruction
from the intermediate representation generated by the first
tier. Thus model partitioning can protect input privacy while
also reducing the amount of computation performed within the
SGX enclave.
We measure the inference runtime of the VGG-16 and
VGG-19 models partitioned at different layers and plot these in
figure 4. The first partition of the model is run inside SGX en-
clave and the second partition is run on a CPU outside of SGX.
For VGG16, as partitioning point moves from 4th, 6th, to 8th
convolutional layer, the inference slowdowns are 2.5x, 3x, and
3.3x respectively. For the VGG-19 model the slowdowns are
2.3x, 2.7x, and 3.2x respectively. More critically if the second
partition is offloaded to a GPU, the slowdowns drop to about
50x, compared to up to 321x slowdown seen with GPU only
execution. Although model partitioning considerably improves
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performance there is still a significant penalty that must be paid
for private inference.
C. Key Idea2: Reducing SGX execution further with Slalom
While model partitioning reduces the amount of computing
done within SGX there is still a significant opportunity to
lower the overheads. Slalom [33] proposed an approach to
enable compute intensive operations to be offloaded to a GPU
from SGX while still preserving privacy. Each layer of the
DNN is split partially between GPU and SGX enclave. The
compute intensive convolutions (matrix multiplications) within
a DNN layer are offloaded to a GPU while allowing the non-
linear operations (such as RELUs) to be performed within an
enclave. However, offloading the convolution layers exposes
the user input to an adversary. For instance, the first layer
in a CNN model convolves the input image with a sliding
window of feature matrix. To prevent the private data exposure
Slalom uses a technique based on cryptography to blind the
data before sending it to the GPU. This technique adds noise
i.e., random elements, which is kept private within the SGX,
to the input matrices within the enclave before releasing the
data to the GPU. These random elements are referred to as
the blinding factors. This noisy input data, with privately held
blinding factors, creates the privacy guarantees by preventing
an adversary from observing (or even reconstructing) the
inputs.
The GPU sends the results of its computation on the noisy
data back to the SGX enclave. Because the GPU is performing
only linear operations (matrix multiplications, in particular)
one can decode GPU results by subtracting the precomputed
noisy components. For this purpose, the Slalom uses the
privately stored unblinding factors to extract the computation
result sans noise before applying non-linear functions within
the enclave. Slalom’s reliance on decodability of computed
data requires the approach to run only linear operations on
GPU while requiring SGX to perform all non-linear oper-
ations. Non-linear operations on noisy data will essentially
render the results undecodable. Thus Slalom must pay the cost
of blinding and unblinding every layer within a CNN model.
We analyzed the performance of Slalom compared to an
execution without any privacy GPU. As we show in our result
section (see Figure 12), the performance of Slalom is about
10x slower. Hence, even though Slalom offloads most of its
computations to a GPU, it still pays non-trivial overheads.
We analyzed the reasons for this slowdown. Our experiments
showed that unblinding or blinding 6MB features roughly
takes 4 milliseconds and there are roughly 47MB and 51MB
intermediates features to process per each inference in VGG-
16 and VGG-19. Hence, a significant fraction of the total
execution time is hobbled by the encoding and decoding of
data.
D. Origami: Combining model splitting with blinding
Using cryptographic blinding can eliminate the cost of SGX
overheads but leads to an increase in blinding and deblinding
overheads. These blinding overheads can be eliminated if one
can avoid blinding the data once the input reconstruction
capability is no longer a concern. By avoiding blinding at
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the earliest possible DNN layer it is possible to execute even
the non-linear operations within a GPU thereby allowing an
uninterrupted execution of multiple CNN layers within a GPU.
Origami framework combines both the techniques. It first
outsources only the linear operations of the layers within the
first partition while executing the non-linear operations inside
the enclave. It then completely outsources the second partition
of a DNN for execution on a CPU or GPU.
IV. ADVERSARY AND THREAT MODEL
Offloading the second partition of the model to an unsecure
CPU or GPU makes all the intermediate data of these layers
available to adversaries. An adversary in the Origami frame-
work is an agent that tries to use the observed intermediate
data of the model to reconstruct the input image sent by the
user to the service. Origami makes the assumption that model
Reconstructed 
image
The intermediate 
feature maps𝚯(X) Generator Discriminator
Private 
image 
X'
X
c
c
The intermediate 
feature maps𝚯(X)
Fig. 5: c-GAN adversary model
weights inside the enclave are private and protected but the
intermediate results from the first tier are openly visible to
an adversary. More specifically, let the function computed by
the hidden layers inside the enclave be Θ, as shown in figure
3a. For some input X , an adversary can observe Θ(X) and
then must find the optimal X ′ that minimizes the loss between
Θ(X) and Θ(X ′) [25].
A. C-GAN Adversary
Origami inferences uses a strong adversary model shown
in figure 5, which is a conditional Generative Adversarial
Network (c-GAN) [28] to learn Θ. GAN [12] is a network that
consists of two DNN models that evolve together, a generator
model G and a discriminator model D. The generator model
G learns the training data distribution by striving to generate
”fake” samples that are difficult for the discriminator D to
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differentiate from the real samples; at the same time the
discriminator model D learns to distinguish if a given sample is
coming from the training data or synthesized by the generator
G. The training process for both models resembles a two-
player min-max game to optimize for the following objective
function, where x is from the training dataset distribution and
z is noise sampled from a multi-variate Gaussian distribution:
min
G
max
D
{Ex∼pdata[logD(x)] + Ez∼pz[log(1−D(G(z))]}
(1)
Conditional GAN [28] builds on top of GAN and uses addi-
tional data c to condition both the generator and discriminator
models, yielding G(z, c) and D(x, c). This extension enables
G to generate samples conditioned on some variable c.
Recall that in Origami the first tier uses blinding factors
to preserve privacy, while the second tier of computing is
done entirely in the open. Thus in the context of Origami, the
adversary trains a c-GAN on the intermediate data generated
from the first tier. The generator network G is trained to
produce the private image inside the enclave as its output.
It takes Θ(X) as input and trains to generate a X ′ as real
as possible. A discriminator network is trained to classify
between a real image X and a fake image X ′ produced by
the generator, given Θ(X). After the c-GAN is trained, the
adversary can use the generator to take in the intermediate data
between the partitions and generate the private input image.
B. Training the c-GAN adversary
The ability of an adversary to train the c-GAN model
depends on two things
1) The information about the input image that is contained
in the intermediate data.
2) The quantity of the training data.
Collecting a lot of training data requires the adversary to
send a huge number of queries to the service and observe all
the corresponding intermediate data to collect enough [Θ(X),
X] pairs. In this work we make the assumption that the
adversary has significant resource advantage to pay for the
cloud service and the cloud service will not limit the number
of queries.
Given these strong adversary assumptions, the intermediate
data should not provide information to enable reconstruction
of the input images. Then even collecting a large amount
of training data will not help the c-GAN model reach high
accuracy. Consider a limiting example of trying to reconstruct
an input image using just the probabilities of the last layer
of the CNN model. In this example all the layers are running
inside the enclave and only the final softmax probabilites are
available outside. It has been empirically shown that using
the softmax probabilities cannot give a good reconstruction
of the input image [10]. The softmax probabilities can contain
information like the color of the image but lack the information
on reconstructing the exact objects in the image. Using earlier
layers as partitioning points increases the probability of an
adversary successfully reconstructing the user input whereas
using deeper layers as partitioning points makes it infeasible
for an adversary to successfully reconstruct the user input.
C. Model partitioning algorithm
Origami framework finds the partitioning layer where split-
ting the model makes it empirically infeasible for the adversary
to perform a good reconstruction of the image. The procedure
followed is described in Algorithm 1. Beginning from the
first layer of the model the procedure empirically verifies, by
training a c-GAN, if input images can be reconstructed from
the intermediate feature maps that are outputs of the current
layer. The metric used to measure the reconstruct-ability is the
popular Structural Similarity (SSIM) [37] between the real
images, X , and the reconstructed images, X
′
. SSIM metric
measures the structural similarity between two images and is
based on the perception of human visual system. A value of
0 indicates no structural similarity.
One surprising observation we found is that if our algorithm
finds that the feature maps from a layer p cannot reconstruct
the inputs, the c-GAN can reconstruct input from a deeper
layer. Thus it becomes necessary to verify c-GAN capabilities
for deeper layers. So, the procedure verifies reconstruct-ability
at layers p + 1 and p + 2 etc., For example, in a VGG-16
model we observed that it is infeasible for the c-GAN to
reconstruct the input images by using feature maps from the
first max pool layer. However, using the feature maps from
the convolutional layers that follow the max pool layer it is
feasible to reconstruct the input images. In our understanding
this happens because the feature maps from the max pool
layer lack the spatial relationships. However, feature maps in
the convolutional layers that follow the first max pool layer
seem to recover enough spatial relationships to get a good
reconstruction of the input images. We provide more details
on the reconstruct-ability in the evaluation section.
Algorithm 1 Model partitioning algorithm
Input: Model M with L layers, c-GAN architecture, image
dataset
Output: Partitioning layer p
for each layer l starting from first layer in L do
Collect the intermediate feature maps mapsi that are the
outputs of layer l for every image i in the dataset
Train a c-GAN using all the (i, mapsi) pairs
Check for reconstruct-ability using SSIM metric
Let p be the layer such that it’s feature maps mapsp
cannot be used by the c-GAN to reconstruct the correspond-
ing input images
Verify reconstruct-ability using maps of next two layers
p + 1, p + 2
if reconstruct-ability is infeasible for p + 1, p + 2 then
select p as the partitioning point for the model M
else
Go back to the for loop and start from layer p + 1
6
Fig. 6: c-GAN architecture
V. IMPLEMENTATION
A. c-GAN architecture and implementation
We design the Generator G of the GAN model as an
encoder-decoder network with a series of residual blocks [15].
As shown in figure 6, the intermediate feature map output
taken from the partition layer p is first fed into the encoder,
which is composed of 3 convolutional layers to down-sample
until it has a spatial dimension of 14× 14. Then this encoded
feature map is fed into 4 residual blocks, before going through
a series of 4 up-sampling blocks acting as a decoder to
generate a fake image of dimension 224 × 224 × 3. The
residual block consists of 3 × 3 stride 1 convolution, batch
normalization and ReLU. The up-sampling block consists of
nearest-neighbor upsampling followed by a 3 × 3 stride 1
convolution. Batch normalization and ReLU are applied after
each convolutional layer.
On the other hand, the Discriminator network D first takes
in an input image of dimension 224 × 224 × 3 and let it go
through 2 convolutional layers to down-sample until it has
the same spatial dimension as its intermediate feature map
c produced from the partition layer p in VGG-16. Then it
is concatenated together with the intermediate feature map
c as condition to be fed into a series of 5 consecutive
convolutional layers, and then a fully connected layer with
Sigmoid activation, to predict whether the input image is
”true” i.e., it is from the training dataset, or ”fake” generated
by the Generator network G. Here the convolutional layers
are 4× 4 with stride 2 and except the last one layer, they are
all followed by batch normalization and LeakyReLU with 0.2
negative slope.
The architectures of the Generator and Discriminator in the
c-GAN are tuned, as needed, to work with the different shapes
of the intermediate feature maps from different partitioning
layers. The c-GAN models, the code to perform model parti-
tioning and collect the intermediate feature maps are written
in Python language using Keras library.
We train the c-GAN adversary models using images from
the Imagenet ILSVRC 2012 validation dataset [9]. This dataset
comprises 50,000 images belonging to 1000 classes. To check
reconstruction at each partitioning layer, the c-GAN is trained
for 150 epochs on a single NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti GPU with a
learning rate of 0.0002. The training time varies depending on
the size of the feature maps of the partitioning layer. Training
for 150 epochs for the 2nd layer took nearly seven days, and
for the 7th layer it took nearly one and half days.
B. Implementation of models in SGX
The code to execute the VGG-16 and VGG-19 models
inside SGX enclaves is written in Python and C++ using
the SGXDNN library from Slalom. The code to execute the
models on CPU or GPU is written using Keras library in
Python.
All the models and SGX code is open source and can be
downloaded from GitHub at https://github.com/cjbaq-origami/
origami inference.
VI. EVALUATION
Here is the outline of our evaluation presentation. As a
first step, we experimentally evaluate the privacy guarantees of
Origami inference, using c-GANs to reconstruct original im-
ages from intermediate features from the two-tier implemen-
tation of VGG. Second, we demonstrate the performance of
Origami inference, against baseline strategies using Slalom’s
SGXDNN library [33]. We compare our framework’s perfor-
mance with that on untrusted CPUs and GPUs to show how
much overhead we still pay to protect privacy.
A. Hardware configuration
We performed all our evaluations on a server consisting of
a Intel Xeon E-2174G CPU equipped with SGX capability
and a NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU attached as an
accelerator. The CPU has 8 threads and 64 GB memory. It’s
operating system is Ubuntu 18.04. The GPU has 11 GB of
GDDR memory.
B. Partitioning and input privacy
We train the c-GAN adversary models and evaluated the
Origami framework using images from the Imagenet ILSVRC
2012 validation dataset [9]. Image reconstructions by the c-
GAN using feature maps at different layers of the VGG-16
model, while running the model partitioning algorithm 1, are
shown in figure 7. Figures 7(a) and (b) show a sample of real
images sent for private inference. In (c) and (d) we show the
reconstructed images generated from the intermediate outputs
from a trained c-GAN. We show the reconstruction capability
of c-GAN after the first and second convolution layers of
VGG-16. In (e) and (f) we show another sample real images
sent for private inference. In (g) and (h) we demonstrate
the surprising result that the c-GAN is unable to reconstruct
the input after layer 3, but it was able to reconstruct input
image from layer 4. As discussed earlier, feature maps in
the convolutional layers that follow the first max pool layer
seem to recover enough spatial relationships to get a good
reconstruction of the input images. In (i) and (j) we show real
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(a) Real images (b) Real images
(c) Reconstructed images from layer 1 (conv) feature maps (d) Reconstructed images from layer 2 (conv) feature maps
(e) Real images (f) Real images
(g) Reconstructed images from layer 3 (max pool) feature maps (h) Reconstructed images from layer 4 (conv) feature maps
(i) Real images (j) Real images
(k) Reconstructed images from layer 6 (max pool) feature maps (l) Reconstructed images from layer 7 (conv) feature maps
Fig. 7: Real images and reconstructed images using feature maps of different layers in VGG-16
images and the reconstruction output from c-GAN using the
intermediate outputs from layer 6 and 7. Clearly after layer
6, in VGG-16 the c-GAN is unable to reconstruct the input,
even when the c-GAN is trained with all input images.
We show the average SSIM metric values between real and
reconstructed images at different layers of the VGG-16 model
in figure 8. The variation of these values clearly indicates
the visual similarity (or its lack thereof) between real and
reconstructed images already shown in figure 7. The visual
similarity is high for the first 2 layers, drops significantly for
the third layer, is again high for the fourth layer, then decreases
and stays below 0.2 for all layers past layer 7.
C. Performance Evaluation
We use three metrics to measure performances of Origami:
(1) Inference runtime: Total time taken to perform a single
inference. (2) SGX enclave memory requirement. SGX enclave
memory is a precious resource and Intel SGX tool chain
requires enclave writers to specify enclave memory usage
statically. During application runtime, allocation of memory
bigger than specified will trigger an exception. (3) Power event
recovery time. Intel’s SGX capable processors will destroy the
memory encryption keys inside them when a power event, such
as hibernation, happens [17]. Thus, SGX applications need to
recreate enclave after power events. Power Event recovery time
is collected to measure Origami inference’s ability to recover
from unexpected power events.
Baseline Strategies: We compare Origami with several base-
lines. The baseline strategy (referred to as Baseline2 in the
figures) performs lazy loading of model parameters into SGX
when loading fully connected layers that require more than
8MB memory. Parameters for such layers are loaded into
8
0.91
0.94
0.22
0.83
0.11
0.21
0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
layer1 layer2 layer3 layer4 layer6 layer7 layer9
SS
IM
 V
al
ue
Similarity between reconstructed and real images
Fig. 8: Similarity between real and reconstructed images at
different partition layers
enclave on demand. Although this strategy induces a small
inference performance penalty by distributing parts of model
loading cost into inference penalty, it can reduce the memory
usage inside SGX enclave which avoids destructive page-
swapping. Baseline 2 is also the baseline the original Slalom
paper used. Note that we also evaluated another baseline
(baseline 1) where all the model parameters are fully loaded
before starting the inference but that baseline was much worse
due to page swapping costs and hence was discarded.
The Slalom/Privacy [33] model implements Slalom ap-
proach where all the layers are interspersed between SGX
and CPU/GPU. All linear computations are offloaded to GPU
after applying blinding, and all blinding, unblinding and non-
linear computations are performed within SGX. Unblinding
factors are pre-computed and are not part of the inference
time. Blinding factors are generated on demand using the same
Pseudo Random Number Generator seed while unblinding
factors are encrypted and stored outside SGX enclave. When
removing noise from intermediate features, Slalom/Privacy
will only fetch parts of unblinding factors needed for a given
layer into SGX enclave. This mode of operation is identical
to the approach suggested in the original Slalom paper.
We also evaluate three model splitting only strategies, where
the first L layers are executed within SGX and the remaining
layers are sent to CPU/GPU. We refer to them as Split/x, where
x is a positive integer signaling the xth layer, after which all
layers are offloaded to untrusted hardware.
1) SGX enclave Memory Usage: Table I shows the re-
quired SGX enclave memory, which is a major limiting
factor for using SGX. Baseline2 uses about 86MB memory,
even though the VGG-16 model size more than 500 MB,
due to the lazy loading process. But it may pay on-demand
data loading penalty during inference. Origami (and Slalom)
have about 2x lower memory overhead than this baseline.
Slalom/Privacy requires 39MB SGX enclave memory, 12MB
of which are used to temporarily store blinding/unblinding
factors. Origami requires the same amount of SGX enclave
memory as Slalom/Privacy does. Both of them have to ac-
commodate enough blinding factors that can blind the largest
intermediate feature map. The largest intermediate feature map
for both Slalom/Privacy and Origami is about 12MB. Also
compared to simple model splitting process Origami does pay
a slight increase in memory penalty due to the use of blinding
factors.
There are two main benefits of reduced memory require-
ment. Our framework can retain its performance even with
significantly low SGX enclave memory. Thus future models
that are much more complex and may need much larger model
sizes may be better accommodated in our framework. Sec-
ond, reduced memory requirement also allows more enclave
applications to run simultaneously. Currently, the maximum
available SGX memory on an Intel chip is 128MB. For
Origami, there is still about 90MB free physical memory that
can be used for other SGX enclave applications or to even
co-run multiple private inference models.
2) Inference Runtime: Figure 9 shows the average runtime
comparison of Origami inference with various baselines. In
this figure all the offloaded computations are executed on
GPU. Compared to executing the entire model within SGX
(baseline 2), Slalom achieves 10x speedup on VGG16 (and
11x on VGG19). Origami achieves 12.7x and 15.1x speedups.
Model splitting at layer 6 (Split/6), which is the minimum
layer split needed to protect privacy, achieves only around 4X
speedup, because the first six layers are essentially unable to
take advantage of the vast GPU acceleration capability.
To understand the vast slowdown seen in the baseline,
figure 11 presents runtime breakdown for baseline 2. The last
three fully connected dense layers (Dense Layer 1,2 and 3)
account for about 40% of baseline 2 runtime. We also analyzed
how much time is spent in each layer doing the data processing
and data movement in and out of SGX memory. We note
that around 50% of the execution time in the fully connected
dense layers is spent on data movement. While Baseline 2’s
active memory footprint can fit within SGX physical protected
memory, its dense layers are loaded on demand to prevent
SGX memory limit overflow. Thus the baseline has to pay the
penalty of fetching parts of parameters on demand. Note that
pre-loading the entire model (our original baseline 1) performs
worse because it exceeds the SGX memory limit as well and
pays significantly more data movement penalty.
The bottleneck of Slalom/Privacy results from its need to
blind and unblind intermediate features to guarantee privacy
across each and every VGG layer. Processing intermediate fea-
tures dominate Slalom/Privacy runtime. As mentioned earlier,
unblinding or blinding 6MB features roughly takes 4 millisec-
onds and there are roughly 47MB and 51MB intermediates
features to process in total for VGG-16 and VGG-19. Blinding
and unblinding intermediate features takes roughly 62 and 68
milliseconds.
Origami achieves speedup by limiting the blinding over-
heads to just a few layers while enabling many layers to be
offloaded to GPU.
Figure 10 shows the performance when all the offloaded
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computations are executed on CPU (no GPU usage). The
highly parallel convolution operations were limited by the
available CPU parallelism. Hence, Slalom achieves only
about 2.9x speedup, while Origami achieves about 3.9x
speedup compared with baseline 2 on VGG-19. Note that
Slalom/Privacy has similar performance with Split/6 offloading
to CPU. In this case the cost of blinding/unblindig is roughly
the same as the computational overhead of executing the
first six layers direcly on the SGX. Slalom achieves smaller
improvements by offloading linear layers when the interme-
diate feature map is too big and untrusted hardware is not
significantly faster.
TABLE I: Enclave Memory Requirements for VGG16
Model Type Required Size
Baseline 2 86MB
Split/6 29MB
Split/8 33MB
Split/10 35MB
Slalom/Privacy 39MB
Origami 39MB
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Fig. 11: Baseline 2 runtime breakdown
3) Power Event Recovery: After a power event, SGX
enclave applications have to be reinitialized. Table II shows
the time to recover from a power event. Split models can
recover much faster than baseline 2 which need to reinitialize
the model parameters before restarting the service. Since Split
models need less memory inside SGX enclave, fewer pages
are encrypted during enclave initialization, and less data are
copied into SGX enclave during model creation. Origami and
Slalom/Privacy will have similar recovery time because they
have the same memory requirement.
TABLE II: Recovery Time from Power Events for VGG16
Model Type Required Time
Baseline 2 201ms
Split/6 51ms
Split/8 54ms
Split/10 59ms
4) Comparison with non-private inference: Figure 12 and
figure 13 present relative inference runtime compared to a
baseline where the entire model is executed in fast hardware
without any privacy guarantees. Compared with CPU, Origami
takes 1.7x longer at most. Origami takes about 8x longer when
compared to running the entire model within a GPU.
The slowdown results from the use of SGX enclave.
Origami and Slalom respectively pay about 47 and 62 mil-
liseconds of penalty for SGX operations related to blinding,
unblinding and non-linear operations for VGG-16. Since a
GPU is well suited for highly parallel inference operations
running the entire model within a GPU is still faster, when
no privacy guarantees are needed. These results show that
supporting private execution environments within accelerators
has significant usage potential in future. When compared
with untrusted CPUs, Origami inference has reasonable per-
formance overhead of 0.7x while providing strong privacy
guarantees.
D. Evaluation Summary
When compared with the baselines, our experiments showed
that Origami framework, while providing strong confidentiality
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guarantees, benefits from offloading computations to fast hard-
ware. Offloading greatly reduces computation and memory
requirements inside SGX enclave. Reduction in memory re-
quirements enables Origami inference to recovery faster from
unexpected power events. Reduced memory requirement for
Origami also allows running more enclave applications simul-
taneously. When compared with Slalom/Privacy, Origami in-
ference benefits from reduced amount of computation assigned
to the SGX enclave and has significantly lower inference
latency.
VII. RELATED WORK
Origami inference uses a combination of model partitioning,
computational offloading and data blinding to provide fast
and private inference. We discuss the related works for each
technique separately.
Model partitioning and offloading: Previous efforts like [5],
[8], [13], [30] focus on improving performance on mobile
devices by partitioning and offloading computation. Neurosur-
geon [19] partitions DNNs and onloads them to mobile devices
to reduce latency and energy consumption. Although Origami
performs model partitioning and offloading, it differs from all
these works in it’s focus on protecting privacy of the data
being processed. Also, Origami only offloads computation to
co-located CPUs and GPUs. Authors of [14] propose a ternary
DNN model partitioning approach to reduce the overhead of
using enclave. Origami differs from this in multiple ways.
First, Origami uses Slalom’s blinding and unblinding and
never performs linear operations inside the enclave. As a
result, Origami has lower inference latency. Second, Origami
protects privacy against a powerful c-GAN adversary [28].
Image reconstruction: A common adversarial objective on
image classification networks is image reconstruction. Authors
of work [10] showed that intermediate feature maps from early
layers in CNNs leak information and that even non-adversarial
models can be optimized to reconstruct input images based
on these feature maps. Making such informative feature maps
available for a powerful adversary can compromise privacy of
input. In our approach we choose the partition point of CNN
models such that the most informative feature maps are blinded
inside SGX and only significant information curtailed feature
maps are completely offloaded. We also choose to protect
against reconstruction by evaluating against a conditional
GAN adversary, since GAN based models are the current state-
of-the-art adversaries. The potency of a GAN trained with
conditional information has been demonstrated in works such
as [21], [24].
Homomorphic encryption: Another paradigm of trying to
provide privacy guarantees when performing inference on ma-
chine learning models is the use of homomorphic encryption.
Recent works [2], [16], [18], [29], [31] have explored using
this technique to provide secure inference on models in the
setting of adversaries trying to learn information about the
data. Encryption and processing on encrypted data contribute
to prohibitively large overheads and Origami inference is
orders of magnitude faster than these methods. The only
overhead Origami incurs is the cryptographic blinding and
unblinding operations on the intermediate feature maps inside
the enclave.
Adding noise for privacy: Authors of [34] train auxiliary
models to inject noise and perform data nullification before
offloading data to the cloud for inference. They retrain the
DNN used in the cloud whereas in Origami the DNN model
is not modified. Shredder [27] partitions the DNN models
between the edge and the cloud, and adds learned noise to the
intermediate data at the edge before offloading to the cloud.
Shredder does not make use of the enclaves and performs
computation on the edge device. Unlike Shredder where the
noise is learned, in Origami the blinding factors are not
learned.
Side channel attacks: Origami relies on the security guaran-
tees provided by Intel SGX. However, SGX has been shown to
be prone to side channel attacks [3], [4] based on speculative
execution bugs like Spectre and Meltdown [20], [22]. Intel is
making updates to it’s hardware and SGX implementation to
increase robustness against these attacks. Techniques proposed
in [35], [36] can be used to defend against bugs in speculative
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execution. Finally, Origami is a general framework and can be
applied to other enclave architectures like Sanctum [7].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In cloud based inference services, protecting the privacy
of the user data is very important. In this work, we pro-
posed Origami Inference which leverages hardware enclaves to
protect the privacy of the user data. With Origami inference
we bring the performance of using an enclave close to the
performance of executing an inference request outside of the
enclave in a CPU or a GPU. Origami inference achieves this by
combining model partitioning with the blinding of data inside
the hardware enclaves. We demonstrate the privacy of Origami
with a strong conditional GAN adversary and show excellent
performance over strong baselines during evaluations. Moving
forward, we plan to explore techniques to further reduce the
amount of computation that need to take place inside the TEE.
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